http://archive.today/2025.11.17-200405/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/17/opinion/venezuela-trump-maduro.html

Is there a vital American interest at stake? There is, and it’s not just the one the administration keeps talking about: drugs.

But the larger challenge posed by Maduro’s regime is that it is both an importer and exporter of instability. An importer, because the regime’s close economic and strategic ties to China, Russia and Iran give America’s enemies a significant foothold in the Americas — one that Tehran reportedly could use for the production of kamikaze drones. An exporter, because the regime’s catastrophic misgovernance has generated a mass exodus of refugees and migrants — nearly eight million so far — with ruinous results throughout the hemisphere. Both trends will continue for as long as the regime remains in power.

Is there a moral case for regime change? Outside of North Korea, few governments have produced more misery for more of their own people than Venezuela’s. Starvation, political brutality, corruption, social collapse, endemic violence, collapse of the medical system, environmental catastrophes — the only thing more shocking than the self-destruction of this once-rich country is the relative indifference to the catastrophe, at least among the usual do-gooders who otherwise like to anguish over the plight of others. Why hasn’t Greta Thunberg set sail to Caracas with symbolic deliveries of food?

Any morally serious person should want this to end. The serious question is whether American intervention would make things even worse.

Are there viable alternatives to conflict? Economic sanctions against the regime in Trump’s first term have worked about as well as economic sanctions usually do — immiserating ordinary people while allowing the regime to entrench itself through its control of ever-scarcer goods. The Biden administration sought détente with the regime by easing some of those sanctions, only to reinstate them after concluding that Maduro had reneged on promises of democratic reforms. Last year’s elections, which the opposition won in a rout, were stolen. The opposition leader María Corina Machado, winner of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize, lives in hiding.

That leaves two plausible alternatives. The first, suggested by Maduro, is to give the United States a stake in Venezuela’s vast mineral wealth, effectively in exchange for allowing him to stay in power. To my surprise, Trump rejected that quasi-colonialist bargain. The second is to use a show of force to persuade Maduro and his senior officials to flee the country, much as Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and his cronies did. To my surprise, too, that hasn’t happened, either. At least not yet. On Sunday, Trump said he was mulling talks with Maduro, perhaps to make that latter option more attractive.

What is the balance of risk? Unintended consequences must be weighed against the predictable risks of inaction. If Trump stands down or conducts limited strikes against sites connected to the drug trade while allowing Maduro to survive, the Venezuelan dictator will see it, rightly, as a resounding victory and vindication. The U.S. will have succeeded only in strengthening his determination to hold on to power rather than relinquish it. And Trump’s hesitation will be read, especially in Moscow and Beijing, as a telling signal of weakness that can only embolden them, just as President Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan did.